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Constitutional Law—First Amendment—Corporate Free Speech: First National
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti On April 9, 1976, five banks and business corpora-
tions operating in Massachusetts 2
 filed suit for declaratory and injunctive re-
lief in the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. 3
 The plaintiffs alleged that
they desired to expend corporate monies to effect the defeat of a ballot ques-
tion before the Massachusetts voters in the November, 1976 election.' This
question would, if approved, allow the state legislature to impose a graduated
tax on the income of individuals. 5
 It was further alleged that the Mas-
' 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
2
 Plaintiffs were the First National Bank of Boston and New England Mer-
chants National Bank, both national banking institutions; Wyman-Gordon Company
and Digital Equipment Corporation, corporations chartered in Massachusetts; and Gil-
lette Company, a Delaware corporation. Id. at 768 n.l.
3 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231A authorizes the Supreme Judicial Court to issue
declaratory judgments.
4 435 U.S. at 769.
s The Graduated Income Tax, (GIT), has long been a subject of controversy
in Massachsetts. In 1962, when a proposed personal and corporate GET was on the
ballot, corportions challenged then MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55, § 7 (West 1946),
which was very similar to the statute set out in note 7 infra. In Lustwerk v. Lytron,
Inc., 344 Mass. 647, 183 N.E.2d 871 (1962), the Supreme Judicial Court held that § 7
did not prohibit corporate expenditures on the GET amendment as the GET was
deemed to "materially affect" the business, property or assets of corporations. The
GIT amendment was defeated in November of 1962 and again in 1968.
In- 1972, by 1972 Mass. Acts ch. 458, the Massachusetts General Court (legislature)
amended ch. 55, § 7 to read:
No question submitted to the voters concerning the taxation of the
income, property, business or assets of individuals shall be deemed mate-
rially to affect the property, business or assets of the corporation.
This provision was challenged in 1972 when a personal and corporate GIT was again
placed on the ballot. The Supreme Judicial Court held that § 7's prohibition applied
only to a referendum question concerned solely with a GIT on individuals, and that it
could not be applied to forbid corporate spending relative to a GIT referendum in-
volving corporate income. First National Bank of Boston v. Attorney General, 362
Mass. 570, 290 N.E.2d 526 (1972). The GIT referendum lost in the 1976 election.
The statute was amended again in 1973, 1974 and 1975. The last of these
amendments, 1975 Mass. Acts ch. 151, is the most recent attempt by the General
Court to conform to the mandate of the Supreme Judicial Court. It created the pres-
ent MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 55, § 8 (West)—the statute at issue in Bellotti. This
statute was worded identically to section 7 of the 1972 version of the statute except for
the insertion of the word "solely":
No question submitted to the voters solely concerning the taxation of
the income, property or transaction of individuals shall be deemed mate-
rially to affect the property, business or assets of the corporation. (em-
phasis supplied)
MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch . 55, § 8 (West).
As a result, the Bellotti plaintiffs, besides being subject to the general statutory
prohibitions set out in note 7 infra, were also made subject to the statute's specific
prohibition against corporate expenditures on personal GIT referenda. Although the
Supreme Judicial Court distinguished the "general" from the "specific" prohibitions,
First National Bank v. Attorney General, 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 134, 148-50, 359 N.E.2d
1262, 1270-72 (1977), the distinction was deemed by the United States Supreme Court ,
to be immaterial for first amendment purposes. 435 U.S. at 772 n.6.
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saehusetts Attorney General (the defendant) had threatened to prosecute the
plaintiffs under the provisions of Massachusetts General Laws, chapter 55,
section 8 if such expenditures occurred. 6 Chapter 55, section 8 prohibits
corporations from expending funds on any public referendum issue which
does not "materially affect" the corporation.' Plaintiffs claimed, inter alia,
that this statute on its face violated the first amendment to the United States
Constitutions
The Supreme judicial Court rejected plaintiffs' first. amendment claim."
While recognizing that chapter 55, section 8, because it restricted spending
relative to the political process, operated in an area of first, amendment con-
cern,'" the Court concluded that plaintiffs, as business corporations, have only
a limited claim to the first amendment's protection." The Supreme judicial
Court held that a corporation can claim first amendment protection for its
speech only when it seeks to communicate on an issue that, materially affects
the corporation's business, property or assets.' 2 Since the challenged statute
itself established these same parameters, it did not violate the free speech
rights of plaintiff corporations. 13
" 435 U.S. at 769.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 55, § 8 (1975) reads, in pertinent part:
fNlio business corporation incorporated under the laws or doing busi-
ness in the commonwealth ... shall directly or indirectly give, pay, expend
or contribute, any money or other valuable thing for the purpose of' ...
influencing or affecting the vote on any question submitted to the voters,
other than one materially affecting any of the property, business or assets
of the corportion....
Any corporation violating any provision of this section shall be
punished by a fine of not more than fifty thousand dollars and any officer,
director or agent of the corporation violating any provision thereof or au-
thorizing such violation, or any person who violates or in any way know-
ingly aids or abets the violation of any provision thereof, shall be punished
by a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars or by imprisonment. for
not inure than one year, or both.
The first amendment reads, in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law
... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or of the right of the people
peaceably to assemble for redress of grievance." U.S. Corsi. amend. 1. By its terms,
the first amendment applies only to acts of the federal government. However, the
amendment has been made applicable to the states through the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 811 (1975); Schneider
v. Slate, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
The BeIlotti plaintiffs also argued that the statute was unconstitutional as applied,
that it was vague and overbroad, that it violated the due process and equal protection
clauses of the fourteenth amendment and articles 16 and 19 of the Declaration of
Rights, Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. 435 U.S. at 770. While
the state court addressed each of these claims, (see note 13 infra), the Supreme Court's
disposition of the first amendment claim made it unnecessary to consider these other
arguments. 435 U.S. at 774 n.8.
" First National Bank of Boston v. Attorney General, 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh.
134, 359 N.E.2d 1262 (1977).
L" Id. at 144, 359 N.E.2d at 1269, quoting, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14
(1976).
" 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 147, 359 N.E.2d at 1270.
12 Id. at 148, 359 N.E.2d at 1270.
13 Id, The Massachusetts Court also rejected the contention that the statute
violated the first amendment as applied because a personal graduated income tax
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On appeal,' 4 the United States Supreme Court, in a five to four deci-
sion," reversed and HELD: That speech otherwise protected by the first.
amendment does not lose that protection simply because the speaker is a cor-
poration.'" The Court further determined that. plaintiffs' proposed speech
would materially affect the corporation; the Court held that since there was a "rational
basis" for the legislative determination that a personal GIT referendum would not
have such an effect, the statute was applied constitutionally. The Court also noted that
plaintiff corporations neither made, nor attempted to make a showing of such an ef-
fect. 1977 Mass. Adv._ Sh. at 148-50, 359 N.E.2c1 at 1271.
The related First amendment claims of overbreadth and vagueness were also re-
jected. Construing the statute narrowly, to avoid forbidding activities and expenditures
in the normal course of corporate affairs, the Court determined that the statute was
not so overbroad as to prohibit protected speech. Id. at 151-54, 359 N.E.2d at 272-73.
The Court admitted that the statute's "materially affecting" limitation was general in
nature, but held that the statute was not vague because the specific prohibition in-
volved in the challenged action—the prohibition concerning expenditures on personal
tax referenda—was both precise and definite. Id. at 154-57, 359 N.E.2d at 1273-74.
Plaintiff's claims based on provisions of the Massachusetts Constitution—articles 16
and 19 of the Declaration of Rights—were rejected on the grounds that these provi-
sions were comparable to the federal constitution's first amendment, and thus con-
trolled by the court's prior resolution of the first amendment claims. Id. at 157-58, 359
N.E.2d at 1274-75.
Plaintiff's argued that the statute's effect on the "fundamental right." of free speech
required that it he examined under a standard of strict scrutiny (See San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1973); Police Department
of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92. 101 (1972)), and claimed further that the statute's
failure to restrict the political expenditures of labor unions, partnerships, business
trusts, charitable corporations and other economic entities beside business corpora-
tions, resulted in an unconstitutional classification. However, the Supreme judicial
Court refused to apply strict scrutiny, since it had already concluded that the first
amendment rights of corporations were not implicated by section 8. Instead, the Court
applied a minimum rationality standard of review. See generally New Orleans v. Dukes,
427 U.S. 297 (1976); Railway Express, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949). The
Court reasoned that since the legislature could rationally determine that other
economic entities did not pose the same problems as business corporations, a "rational
basis" for the classification did exist and there was thus no violation of the equal pro-
tection rights of business corporations. 1977 Mass. Ads'. Sh. at 159-61, 359 N.E.2d at
1275.
Plaintiffs finally contended that the specific legislative judgment that questions
concerning the taxation of individuals do not effect business corporations created an
irrebutable legislative presumption of a fact constituting one of the elements of the
crime. This, it was argued, was in violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. See genet-01h Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398 (1970); Tot v. United
States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943). The Massachusetts Court rejected this argument as well,
concluding that the state properly remained with the burden of proving all of the
elements of the crime. 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 161-63, 359 N.E.2d at 1275-76.
' 4 430 U.S. 964 (1977) (probable jurisdiction noted). 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2)
(1966) authorizes direct appeal to the Supreme Court of an order front any state high
court upholding the validity of a state statute under the federal constitution, a federal
law, or federal treaty.
15 Justice Powell wrote the opinion of the Court. The Chief Justice concurred
in a separate opinion. 435 U.S. at 795-802. Justice White, joined by Justices Brennan
and Marshall, dissented. Id. at 802-23. Justice Rehnquist filed a separate dissenting
opinion. Id. at 823-28.
435 U.S. at 784.
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was protected by the first amendment,' 7 and that neither the state's interest in
protecting the electoral process from undue corporate influence nor in pro-
tecting the rights of corporate shareholders were sufficient to withstand re-
view under a strict scrutiny standard." The Court therefore found the Mas-
sachusetts statute unconstitutional as an abridgement of corporate rights to
free speech.' 9
Bellotti is the first case in which the United States Supreme Court has
attempted to define the nature and extent to which the speech of corpora-
tions is protected under the first amendment. This decision gains added sig-
nificance by suggesting a method and terms by which restrictions on corpo-
rate speech should be examined in the future. In effect, the Bellotti Court
simply applied, in the context of corporate speech, the traditional first
amendment standard of review. The Court's discussion and disposition of the
various interests asserted by the state to justify restricting corporate communi-
cations will have significant impact upon similar regulatory attempts in the
future.
This casenote will first examine briefly the status of corporate speech
prior to Bellotti. The Bellotti decision itself will then be examined, with particu-
lar attention accorded the Court's perception and definition of the issue be-
fore it and the Court's treatment of the principal interests asserted by the
state on behalf of its statutory restriction of corporate speech. Finally, this
casenote will evaluate the reasoning of Bellotti and discuss the general implica-
tions of the decision on corporate speech generally, and in particular the im-
pact of the decision on a municipal corporation's claim to first amendment
protection will be analyzed.
I. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF BOSTON V. BELLOTTI
A. The Unexamined Status of Corporate Speech Prior to Bellotti
From a very early date the United States Supreme Court has held that a
business corporation is a "person" as that term is used within the due process
and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment. 2° Yet the Court
had failed, prior to Bellotti, to discuss in any meaningful way corporate rights
under the more specific terms of the first amendment. Most often in free
speech cases the Court has focused upon the character of the speech at issue.
As a result, the Court had not endeavored to define with precision the rights
of certain speakers, such as corporations, to exercise first amendment rights.
17 Id. at 776-78.
PH Id. at 795.
1 " Id.
20 See, e.g., Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 522 (1898); Covington & Lexington
Turnpike Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 592 (1896); Santa Clara County v. Southern
Pacific R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886); but see Hague v. Committee for Industrial
Organization, 307 U.S. 496, 527 (1937) (opinion of Stone, J.) ("the liberty [guaranteed
by the due process clause] is the liberty of natural, not artificial persons"), (quoting,
Northwestern Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243, 255 (1906)); Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Western Turf Ass'n v. Greenberg, 204 U.S. 359, 363
(1907).
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The first application of substantive first amendment safeguards within a
corporate context occurred in the 1936 case of Grosjean v. American Press
Co." In Grosjean, several corporations engaged in publishing newspapers
challenged a Louisiana statute which established a two percent license tax
which was applicable only to publishers of newspapers with circulation in ex-
cess of 20,000. The Supreme Court, in sustaining the publishers' first
amendment challenge to the tax, expressly rejected the state's contention that
corporations could not claim first amendment rights through the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment." In reaching this decision, however,
the Court simply applied precedents which involved the due process rights of
corporations generally; 23 no specific discussion of corporate first amendment
rights was provided. In addition, the Grosjean Court was not faced with a state
attempt to distinguish corporate speech from non-corporate speech since the
license tax applied to all publishers of newspapers with a circulation of 20,000
or more. As a result, the Court in Grosjean recognized a general corporate
right to claim first amendment protection through the fourteenth amend-
ment, but did not define the nature or parameters of this right.
Although the Court in subsequent years decided numerous cases in which
corporations sought first amendment protection, 24 the significance of the
speaker's corporate status was never explored. It is significant to note that, as
in Grosjean, each of these cases involved statutes or regulatory efforts which
made no distinction between the speech of corporations and the speech of
individuals." The best opportunities for defining the status and parameters
of the protection to be afforded corporate speech under the first amendment
were provided in several cases arising under the Federal Corrupt Practices
Act." That Act forbids corporations, as well as labor unions, from contribut-
21 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
22 Id. at 244.
23 See authorities cited in note 20, supra.
21 See Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Cox Broadcasting Co. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975); Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); New York Times Co. v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); Joseph
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson. 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
2 ' See, e.g., Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974)
(Florida's "right to reply" statute applies to "any newspaper" which "assails the per-
sonal character of any candidate."—FLA. STAT. § 104.38 (repealed, 1975)).
26 2 U.S.C. § 44Ib (1976) (formerly 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1948)). A large number
of states have similar statutory provisions limiting the political activity of corporations
and labor unions. See, e.g., ALA. CODE 14. 10, § 10-2-168 (Supp. 1979); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. § 16-471 (1975); lowA CODE ANN. § 56.29 (West) (Supp. 1979-80); KAN. STAT. §
25-1709 (1973); Ky. REV. STAT. § 121-035(1) (Supp. 1978); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch .
55, § 8 (West) (Supp. 1979); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 210A.34 (West) (Supp. 1980); MONT.
REV. CODES ANN. § 23-4744 (Stipp. 1977); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 70:2(1) (1970); N.J.
REV. STAT. § 19: 34-45 (1964); N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 14-116 (McKinney) (1978); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 16-20-08 (Stipp. 1977); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3599.03 (Baldwin)
(1975); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 15-110 (West) (Stipp. 1979-80); OR. REV. STAT. §
260.472 (1977); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 12-25-2 (Supp. 1979); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 2-1932 (Supp. 1972); TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. art. 14.06 (Stipp. 1980); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 11.38(1)(a)(I) (West) (Supp. 1979-80).
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Mg to or making expenditures on behalf of candidates for federal elective
office. The Act clearly distinguishes corporate from "private" speech, and
thus would conceivably provide courts with an opportunity to consider the
constitutional issues raised by such a distinction. However, on the four occa-
sions in which the Corrupt Practices Act was challenged, the Supreme Court
disposed of the cases on grounds which rendered consideration of the con-
stitutional issues premature and unnecessary." Thus, when five business
corporations sued fOr injunctive and declaratory relief in Massachusetts, the
exact nature and scope of first amendment protection available for corporate
speech was an unresolved question."
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court squarely faced in Bellotti the
issue which had been left unresolved by the Supreme Court. While conceding
that section 8 potentially impinged on first amendment freedoms by restrict-
ing expenditures relative to the political process," the Court did not consider
this fact alone to be dispositive of the constitutional issue involved. The "basic
question" as to section 8's validity, stated the Supreme Judicial Court, is
"whether business corporations, such as the plaintiffs, have First Amendment
rights coextensive with those of natural persons." 3 °
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court concluded that a corporation's
rights under the first amendment are not the same as those of a natural per-
son. 3 ' The Court reasoned that a corporation has rights under the first and
27 See Con v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 69-70 (1975) (Court, holding that Act does not.
imply a private cause of action, does not reach constitutional issues); Pipefitters Local
Union No. 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 400-01 (1972) (Court remands case for
proper jury instructions, does not address constitutional issues); United States v.
United Auto Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 589-91 (1957) (Case remanded for full trial prior to
determination of constitutional issues); United States v. Council on Industrial Organi-
zation, 335 U.S. 106, 124 (1948) (Act held inapplicable to conduct alleged, constitu-
tional question not reached).
Justice Douglas, concurring in United Auto Workers, 352 U.S. at 593-98, and Justice
Rutledge concurring in Council on Industrial Organization, 335 U.S. at 129-56 would
have reached the first amendment issues implicated. Both would have concluded that
the Corrupt Practices Act violates the first amendment rights of corporations and labor
A number of lower federal courts have considered the constitutional issues raised
by the Federal Corrupt Practices Act. All have held the Act valid. See, e.g., United
States v. Chestnut., 533 F.2d 40 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 829 (1976); United
States v. Boyle, 482 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1076 (1973); United
States v. Russell, 415 F. Supp. 9 (W.D. Tex. 1975); United States v. Painters Local
Union No. 481, 79 F. Supp. 516 (D. Conn. 1948), rev'd on other grounds, 172 F.2d 854
(2d Cir. 1949).
28
 A few state and lower federal courts have been willing to deal directly with
the issue of first amendment protection for corporate speech. See Fram v. Yellow Cab
Co., 380 F. Supp. 1314, 1334 (W.D. Pa. 1974) (held protected); Borough of Col-
lingswood v. Ringold, 66 N.J. 350, 331 A.2d 262 (1975) (speech not denied protection
merely because its source is a corporation).
29
 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 144, 359 N.E.2d at 1269, citing Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976).
39 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 145, 359 N.E.2d at 1269.
31 Id. at 147, 359 N.E.2d at 1270.
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fourteenth amendments only to that extent necessary to protect the business
or property interests of the corporation." Thus, the Court. held that "only
when a general political issue materially affects a corporation's business, prop-
erty or assets may that corporation claim First Amendment protection for its
speech or other activities entitling it to communicate its position on that issue
to the general public." 33 Section 8, which itself prohibited corporate spend-
ing only on referenda questions not materially affecting the corporation,
therefore did not violate plaintiff corporations' first amendment rights. By
appealing this decision, the plaintiffs placed before the United States Supreme
Court an opportunity to finally consider and define the first amendment
rights of corporations.
B. The Supreme Court Decision
From the outset of justice Powell's discussion of the substantive first
amendment issue for the Bellotti majority, 14 it is clear that the Court has
adopted a different approach from that espoused by the Supreme Judicial
Court. Justice Powell stated that the Supreme Judicial Court, by phrasing the
inquiry in terms of the extent to which a corporation could claim first
amendment protection, posed the "wrong question." 35 Since the first
amendment often serves "societal interests" broader than those of the party
seeking their vindication, 36 the correct. question must be "whether § 8 abridges
expression that the First Amendment was meant to protect." 37
32 Id.
33 Id. at 148, 359 N.E.2d at 1270.
34 Because the 1976 referendum upon which the plaintiffs based their com-
plaint had been held prior to the time the controversy reached the Supreme Court,
the threshold issue of moonless had to be resolved before the Court could reach a
determination on the merits. 435 U.S. at 774-75. Classifying the case as one "capable
of repetition, yet evading review" the Court concluded that it was not moot. See gener-
ally Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975); Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v.
ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911). The Court was satisfied that both conditions necessary
for invoking the doctrine were present. First, the challenged action was too short in its
duration to be fully litigated prior to its expiration. The Court observed that there are
approximately eighteen months between the legislative authorization of a proposed
referendum and the election. This is too short a time to obtain complete judicial re-
view and, in any event, judicial review itself is meaningless if the plaintiffs are not
given enough time before the election to effectively communicate their views. 435 U.S.
at 774.
Second, the Court believed that there was at least a "reasonable expectation" that
the complainants would be subject to the same action again. In support of this conten-
tion the Court pointed to the repeated submission of the GIT issue to the voters, (see
note 5 supra); the plaintiffs' insistence that they would continue to oppose a GIT; and
the defendant's assertion that. he would continue to enforce the law. Id. at 774-75.
In addition to invoking the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" doctrine
the Court seemed inclined to view the continued 'chilling" effect of § 8 as precluding
moonless. The statute's criminal penalties discouraged corporations from obtaining re-
view by violating the law, and the statute's effect would linger despite the technical
passing of the particular controversy. Id. at 775.
35
 435 U.S. at 776.
3" Id.
37 Id.
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Having taken an approach which focuses on the type of speech involved
rather than the identity of the speaker, Justice Powell had little difficulty in
concluding that the speech restricted by section 8 was protected by the first
amendment. The Massachusetts statute obviously restricted speech relating to
discussion of public, political affairs. 38 The majority agreed that this type of
speech is "indispensible to decisionmaking in a democracy" 39 and lies at the
very "heart" of the first amendment. 4° For the Bellotti Court the value of
such speech in informing the public as to important public issues is not al-
tered by the identity of the speaker."'
Justice Powell then turned to the Supreme Judicial Court's conclusion
that a corporation could claim protection for its speech only to the extent
necessary to protect its property or business interests. Terming the Supreme
Judicial Court's position a "novel and restrictive gloss" on the first amend-
ment, he thoroughly rejected this reasoning. 42 Justice Powell not only denied
that the "materially affecting" test articulated by the Massachusetts court had
been the governing rationale in any prior decision of the Supreme Court, 43
39 That political expenditures are political "speech," and not merely conduct
related to speech, for purposes of the first amendment was settled in Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1976). For a critique of this conclusion, see Wright, Politics
and the Constitution: Is Money Speech? 85 YALE L.J. 1001 (1976).
The speech/conduct distinction is important in determining the standard of review
applicable to a given governmental restriction. If "pure speech" is restricted, the gov-
ernment must show that its interest is "compelling" and that there is no less restrictive
means of achieving that interest. See text and notes at notes 46 & 47 infra. However, if
only conduct relating to speech is restricted, the government just needs to demonstrate
an "important" or "substantial" interest. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,
377 (1968) (conviction of appellant for destroying draft card upheld).
as 435 U.S. at 777.
4° Id. at 776. The Court's discussion in this regard tends to imply a view of the
first amendment which elevates political speech to a level somewhat above other types
of speech. This view of the first amendment has support in prior case law. See, e.g.,
Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 61 (1976); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 14 (1976); Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 573 (1968); Mills v.
Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964);
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); NAACP v. Alabama, 357
U.S. 449 (1958); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1954); Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88. 101-02 (1940). See also A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS
RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948). However, the view that political speech has a
preferred status among first amendment values has also been questioned. See, e.g.,
Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 73 n.1 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring);
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 763 (1976); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948).
41 435 U.S. at 777.
42 Id. at 777-83.
" Justice Powell conceded that the "materially affecting" theory would satisfy
the media and commercial speech cases, but denied that the theory was relied upon in
any of these decisions. 435 U.S. at 781. The Court interpreted the media cases as
focusing on the constitutional role of the media in informing the public and providing
a public forum for the debate and discussion. See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389-90 (1969); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966); New'
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964). Similarly, the commercial speech
cases were viewed as vindicating the public's interest in the free flow of information
rather than a corporate entity's right to disseminate commercial information. 435 U.S.
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but observed that no prior decision had recognized a separate source of pro-
tection under the first and fourteenth amendments when a corporation as-
serted the constitutional right. 44 Grosjean v. American Press Co., 45 Justice
Powell emphasized, expressly rejected the Supreme Judicial Court's conclusion
that a corporation's "liberty" (as opposed to "property") interests are not pro-
tected under the first and fourteenth amendments." There was, therefore,
no basis for the Supreme Judicial Court's purported limitations of the first
amendment rights of corporate speakers.
Having concluded that the plaintiffs' proposed speech was within the pro-
tection of the first amendment, and having further rejected reasoning of the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court that speech loses its protection when its
proponent is a corporation, Justice Powell reviewed the propriety of section 8
under a "strict scrutiny" standard. 47 Under this standard, a state can justify
restriction of protected speech only by articulating a "compelling" governmen-
tal interest furthered by the restriction." In addition, a state must show that
the means chosen to serve this governmental interest are carefully drawn so as
not to impose undue burdens on protected rights."
To meet this standard, Massachusetts advanced two principal justifications
for the restrictions contained in section 8. First, the state cited a desire to
maintain the integrity of the electoral process and to protect the role of indi-
vidual citizens within the political system." Second, the state proposed to
prevent corporate shareholders from indirectly financing corporate political
purposes at odds with their individual political views." The Bellotti majority
considered, but ultimately rejected, both of these arguments.
Justice Powell conceded that a state's interest in maintaining electoral in-
tegrity and individual political participation is compelling." Nevertheless,
at 781-83. See, e.g., Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85,
95 (1977); Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 764 (1976).
The Court appeared troubled at the implicit suggestion in the Supreme Judicial
Court's holding that commercial speech would be protected because it relates to a
corporation's business while political speech would not. The Court noted that until
recently the commercial nature of speech undermined its entitlement to protection, and
was therefore unwilling to extend greater protection to a merchant's "hawking of
wares" than to political debate. 435 U.S. at 783 n.20. See generally Virginia State Board
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24;
Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942); Note, Advertising of Prescription Drug
Prices as Protected Commercial Speech, 19 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REV. 276 (1977).
" 435 U.S. at 780.
45 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
" 435 U.S. at 781 & n.16.
42 Id. at 786.
42 Id. See, e.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 362 (1976); NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415, 458 (1969).
49 Id. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 425 U.S. 1, 25 (1976); NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415, 438-39 (1963); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960).
50 435 U.S. at 787.
5 ' Id.
52 Id. at 778-79. See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27 (1976); Civil Service
Comm'n v. Nat'l. Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565 (1973); United States v.
United Auto Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 570 (1957).
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section 8 was not sufficiently related to this interest to pass constitutional mus-
ter. Although a state may legislate to prevent both the reality and the appear-
ance of political corruption, section 8 focused upon referenda questions ex-
clusively. Justice Powell reasoned that since referenda questions involve issues
and not particular candidates, there is no danger of improper quid pro quo
arrangements in" the referenda context and, hence, no danger of corruption.
Thus, a ban on referenda expenditures is not sufficiently related to an in-
terest in preventing the corruption of political candidates.•" As an alternative
ground, the state argued that, because of highly concentrated economic
power, corporate participation in the electoral process results in undue corpo-
rate influence over elections." The majority, however, concluded that the
record before it contained insufficient proof of such "undue influence" or
threat to the citizens' confidence to justify the statutory restriction on this
basis. 55
In addition to rejecting the state's argument on the basis of insufficient.
evidence, justice Powell's subsequent reasoning and discussion implies a more
general dissatisfaction with the "undue corporate influence" argument. The
Court cited Buckles, v. Valeo 5" for the proposition that attempts by the gov-
ernment to restrict or limit the relative political influence of individual ele-
ments within society are disfavored." The Buckles, Court., in holding uncon-
stitutional a federal statute limiting the permissible amounts an individual may
expend independently on behalf of a political candidate," stated, "the concept
53 435 U.S. at 790. Every court which has considered this question has also
made the distinction between candidate elections and referenda questions and found
the danger of corruption not present in the latter. See Schwartz v. Romnes, 495 F.2(1
844, 851-53 (2c1 Cir. 1974); C & C Plywood Corp, v. Hanson, 420 F. Supp. 1254 (D.
Mont. 1976), gird, No. 76-3118 (9th Cir. October 3, 1978); Pacific Gas & Electric v.
Berkeley, 60 Cal. App. 3d 123, 128-29, 131 Cal. Rptr. 350, 353 (1976); Advisory Opin-
ion on Constitutionality of 1975 Public Act 227, 396 Mich. 465, 242 N.W.2d 3 (1976).
It was on this point that the Court distinguished the case before it from the Cor-
rupt Practices Act (see text and notes at notes 26 & 27 supra). The Court ventured no
opinion on the constitutionality of these Acts. 435 U.S. at 788 n.26, 790.
." 435 U.S. at 789.
•5 435 U.S. at 789-90. The only evidence of this sort in the record was a re-
port of personal and corporate contributions to committees supporting and opposing
the Massachusetts Graduated Income Tax referendum question in 1972. These •ec-
ords showed that the predominantly business supported Committee for Jobs and
Government Economy raised and expended $120,000 to oppose the referendum,
whereas the pro-GIT Coalition for Tax Reform, Inc. raised and expended only $7000.
See Brief for Appellants, Appendix to Jurisdictional Statement at page 41, First Na-
tional Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). Justice Powell, however, found
this record insufficient to establish any undue corporate influence, as Massachusetts
does not require reporting of expenditures made independently of organized commit-
tees.
Justice Powell also claimed that the result of the 1976 GIT referendum in itself
rebutted any inference of overwhelming corporate political influence; despite the total
absence of corporate referenda spending in 1976, the GIT was still defeated. 435 U.S.
at 789 n.26.
." 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
57 435 U.S. at 790-91.
" 18 U.S.C.	 608(e)(1)(1971) (repealed 1976).
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that government may restrict some elements in our society in order to en-
hance the relative voices of others is wholly foreign to the First Amend-
ment."'" justice Powell, citing this language in the corporate context.,
suggests strongly that any attempt to limit the political influence of a particu-
lar speaker—corporate or otherwise—is impermissible."
The second justification advanced by the state in Bellotti was a desire to
protect corporate shareholders by preventing the use of corporate funds for
political purposes. While accepting, arguendo, this interest as compelling,"' the
majority concluded that section 8 was both over and underinclusive as a
means for achieving this end. justice Powell explained that the statute was
underinclusive because it proscribed only one category of corporate political
activity while leaving unfettered other types of corporate political spending
that might also displease shareholders. 1i 2 In addition, the statute did not.
purport to limit the political activity of other artificial economic entities, such
as labor unions and investment trusts, which include individuals in the same
relative position as corporate shareholders." The Court based its determina-
tion of overinclusiveness on the statute's absolute prohibition of corporate
spending on referenda even when there is unanimous authorization by af-
fected shareholders. In such a situation, the Court held, protection is not.
needed."' Since the interests advanced by the state in the context of ref-
erenda spending were inadequate to meet the stringent test of strict judicial
scrutiny, Justice Powell and the Bellotti majority held Massachusetts General
Laws, chapter 55, section 8 unconstitutional as violative of the first amend-
ment."5
C. Justice White's Dissent
The principal dissenting opinion in Bellotti was filed by justice White."
His opinion indicates strong disagreement with the majority both as to the
5" 429 U.S. at 48-49.
"" 435 U.S. at 790-92. Compare Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418
U.S. 241 (1979) (state "right to reply" law struck down) with Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (FCC "fairness doctrine" upheld).
'' 435 U.S. at 795.
1 i 2
 For example, the statute does not prohibit corporate spending on public or
political issues not the subject of a referendum, nor does it forbid corporate lobbying
activities. c f Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365
U.S. 127 (1961) (Sherman Act held not to prohibit lobbying activities).
" 3
 435 U.S. at 793.
64
 Id. at 794.
"' In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Burger felt compelled to anticipate
questions likely to arise in the future. The Chief Justice was concerned that judicial
acceptance of the Massachusetts position on corporate speech would lead to
heightened and possibly dangerous state regulation of corporations engaged in the
media and communications businesses. Arguing as a matter of both fact and constitu-
tional law that it is difficult to distinguish media corporations from business corpora-
tions, the Chief Justice maintained that a failure to scrutinize carefully all governmen-
tal limitations on corporate expression would endanger the freedom of persons using
the corporate form to engage in the business of publication or communication. 435
U.S. at 795-801.
"" 435 U.S. at 802-23. Justice Rehnquist submitted a separate dissent. Id. at
823-28.
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degree of protection afforded corporate speech, and the weight to be given
the interests advanced by the state. While the Bellotti majority focused upon
the type of speech involved, Justice White considered the identity of the
speaker to be highly relevant for first amendment purposes. Although con-
ceding that corporate communications come within the scope of the first
amendment, Justice White nevertheless contended that such speech is simply
not "fungible" with private or individual speech." He argued that since cor-
porate speech does not involve the notion of individual self-expression, it does
not further what he perceived to be the "principal function" of the first
amendment and was therefore entitled to less stringent protection. 68
In determining the weight to be accorded the interests advanced by the
state in order to justify its restriction of corporate speech, Justice White first
considered the state's interest in preventing undue or overwhelming corporate
influence on elections. He sharply criticized the majority's suggestion that
Buckley v. Valeo could be applied in the context of corporate speech to prohibit
attempts to restrict corporate political influence." A state's interest in pre-
venting undue influence, Justice White argued, assumes a different dimension
where corporations are involved. Corporations are artificial entities, created
by the state for economic purposes. They are granted special privileges, such
as limited liability and perpetual life, by the state to effectuate these economic
purposes to the fullest extent. Presumably the state profits from the economic
activity which this scheme permits. Yet these corporate advantages, which may
be of economic benefit to the state, may also be a political disadvantage. The
state should not be put in the position of having corporate wealth accumu-
lated through state-sanctioned economic advantages used to acquire unfair
political advantages: "The State need not permit its own creation to consume
it."'" The prevention of this possibility, Justice White argued, is a far differ-
ent state concern than simply the equalization of individual political re-
sources.'
"I Id. at 804.
Id. at 804-07. justice White distinguished business corporations such as the
Bellotii plaintiffs from corporations formed specifically for the purposes of advancing
political or ideological beliefs. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428 (1963). He
argued that corportions falling into the latter category arc merely using the corporate
form to achieve effective self-expression, whereas business corporations have no such
political bent. but are instead created and used by the shareholders for strictly
economic purposes. The unanimity of purpose in such organizations breaks clown
when corporate funds are used for political purposes unrelated to the corporation's
business. Lacking unanimity of political purpose, business corporations cannot be con-
sidered as a forum for the self-expression of shareholders. 435 U.S. at 805-06.
While Justice White gave controlling consideration to the self-expression function
of the first amendment, he was willing to recognize other values within the first
amendment's protective sweep. While one of these is the right to receive information,
Justice White expressed doubt that even a complete prohibition of corporate com-
munication would result in the loss of any significant information. Individual officers,
shareholders, and employees of the corporation would remain free to communicate
any ideas to the public that the corporation itself might wish to express. 435 U.S. at
807.
6"
 435 U.S. at 809.
7 ° Id. at 810.
71 Id. at 809-10.
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In addition, Justice White challenged the majority's conclusion that the
record showed inadequate "proof" of overwhelming corporate influence to
support a legislative attempt to prevent such influence. 72 Analyzing the
statistics used by the majority, White arrived at a different conclusion concern-
ing the existence of undue corporate influence. 73 In addition, on a more
fundamental level, he questioned the propriety of substituting the Court's
judgment for that of the state legislature in determining "undue" corporate
influence. That question, Justice White argued, is uniquely tailored for reso-
lution by a political branch of government. 74
Justice White was also ready to accord greater weight to the state's in-
terest in protecting the rights of corporate shareholders. Relying on the
Court's 1977 decision in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,'' ) Justice White
argued that by restricting corporate political expenditures to protect
shareholders the state furthered interests recognized under the first amend-
ment." In Abood, the Court held that public employees, compelled by a col-
lective bargaining agreement to pay an "agency fee" to a labor union as a
condition of employment, had a first amendment right to prohibit the use of
these funds for political purposes by the union." This right stems from the
individual's right to adhere to and support his own views, and to refuse to
provide support for the views or beliefs of others. 78 Justice White contended
that the Massachusetts statute, by limiting the political uses to which corporate
funds may be put, furthered the first amendment protection recognized in
Abood. 78 Justice White would therefore uphold the constitutionality of chap-
ter 55, section 8 based upon both interests asserted by the State."
72 Id. at 810-11 & n.11.
73 Id.
74 Id. See generally Leventhal, Courts and Political Thickets, 77 CoLurt. L. Rev.
345 (1977).
75 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
7 " 435 U.S. at 813.
77 431 U.S. at 235-36.
78 Id. at 234-36.
75 Justice White recognized that Abood was not perfectly analogous to the situa-
tion presented in Bellotti. The political use of shareholder funds by private corpora-
tions does not, without more, implicate the first amendment as it lacks the "state
action" necessary to trigger the constitutional guarantee. See Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S.
715 (1961); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). Although recognizing that no
affirmative duty to protect shareholders exists, Justice White maintained that this does
not preclude a state from choosing to protect this interest, since, "[s]tates have always
been free to further rights protected by the Constitution even when not compelled to
do so." 435 U.S. at 814.
The majority disposed of the Mood analogy in a footnote, finding it "irrelevant."
Besides noting the lack of state action in the Bellotti circumstances, Justice Powell noted
that while the teachers in Abood were required to pay the union service fee or lose
their jobs, the corporate shareholders in Bellotti were not subject to such coercion.
The Court also refused to extend the Abood remedy—refund of the portion of the
dissenter's fee improperly spent—to the total ban on political expenditures worked by
the Massachusetts statute. Id. at 794 n.34.
Unpersuaded by either of these distinctions Justice White argued that a choice
between political use of funds and withdrawal of investment was no less a burden on
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II. THE AFTERMATH OF BELLOTT1
A. The Analvtical Framework
Of central significance in Bellotti is the manner in which the Court per-
ceived and framed the core issues. This analytical framework is composed of
two steps. First, the Court determined the type of speech affected by the stat-
ute. Since this speech, considered without regard to the speaker's identity, was
protected by the first amendment, the statute was evaluated under a strict
scrutiny standard of review. At the second step in the analysis the state was
required to articulate compelling interests served by the statute which did not
infringe unduly upon protected expression. By choosing to focus upon the
character of the speech involved rather than its source, the Court was able
both to limit the breadth of its inquiry and establish a meaningful framework
for subsequent analysis and application. Although the Bellotti majority failed
to articulate clearly the underlying rationale, it is submitted that the Court's
approach is correct.
By focusing upon the nature of the speech being controlled, the Bellotti
majority merely applied traditional first amendment analysis of governmental
restrictions. The characterization of speech as obscene, defamatory, fighting
words or commercial has always been a crucial factor in free speech cases. 8 '
This is true even when corporations have claimed first amendment rights. 82
As viewed in this context, Bellotti breaks no new ground. However, the prob-
lem before the Bellotti Court was unique in one important respect. In virtually
all prior cases the Court was required to determine whether particular speech
was protected by the first amendment. 83 Further, the challenged governmen-
tal restrictions on speech in these previous cases operated on individuals and
corporations alike. 84 But Massachusetts did not claim in Bellotti that all ex-
the dissenter's first amendment rights than that contained in Abood. While refund was
readily available in the Abood context, Justice White contended that inability to segre-
gate one shareholder's ownership interest from another makes this remedy unwork-
able in the corporate context. Id. at. 808.
justice White also found that. the statute protected the state's economic viability by
eliminating the danger of ideological and political influence over investors. hi. at 818-
19.
435 U.S. at 821-22. In a separate dissent, Mr. Justice Rehnquist espoused a
view of corporate free speech rights even more restrictive than that of Justice White.
435 U.S. at 822-28. He argued that the first amendment protects only speech affecting
the very existence of the corporation. Id. at 824, quoting, Dartmouth College v.
Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819).
8 ' See, e.g., Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (commer-
cial speech); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Roth v. United States, Alberts v.
California, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (obscenity); Chaptinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568 (1942) (fighting words).
82 See note 25 supra.
83
 A related issue is whether "speech" is implicated at all. See United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (appellant's burning of draft. card held not to he speech
but merely "conduct relating io speech").
84 See, e.g., Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85
(1977) (town ordinance forbidding all posting of "For Sale" signs on property chal-
lenged by corporations and individuals).
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penditures on behalf of public referenda questions were, in themselves, un-
protected by the first amendment; after Buckley v. Valeo, this argument was
untenable." Further, section 8 as challenged in Bellotti was not neutral in
application; it specifically restricted only corporate speech. Under these cir-
cumstances, the propriety of determining a statute's constitutionality by means
of the traditional first amendment approach is not readily apparent.
However, when the broad range of interests protected by the first
amendment are considered, the Court's analytical framework appears to be
justified. Both the Massachusetts contention that only the speaker's rights
under the Constitution control in determining the extent of first amendment
protection," and Justice White's view that speech should be evaluated in rela-
tion to individual self-expression," ignore the often substantial interests of
non-speakers. As the Bellotti majority recognized, there are broader societal
interests that come within the first amendment's protection."
The right to receive information has figured quite prominently in the
first amendment decisions of the Supreme Court. Although this "right" has
been invoked in a wide variety of contexts, 89 a particularly illustrative example
is the Court's 1976 decision in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citi-
zens Consumer Council, Inc." In Virginia Board of Pharmacy, a consumer group
challenged a state regulation forbidding pharmacists to advertise prescription
drug prices. In granting the consumers standing to raise the first amendment
claim the Court stated: "Freedom of speech presupposes a willing speaker.
But where a speaker exists, as is the case here, the protection afforded is to
the communication, to its source and to its recipients both."" The Supreme
Court struck down the advertising ban, finding an unwarranted interference
with the free flow of commercial information. 92
The Court's analysis in Bellotti is consistent with this reasoning." The
approach of the Massachusetts Supreme judicial Court, which considered only
" See note 35 supra. Indeed, the Massachusetts Court explicitly recognized
that section 8 operated in an area of fundamental first amendment activities. 1977
Mass. Adv. Sh. at 144, 359 N.E.2d at 1269.
86 See text and notes at notes 28-30 supra.
87 435 U.S. at 804-05.
88 Id. at 776.
89 See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 408-09 (1974) (right of access to
information concerning prison conditions); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564
(1969) (right to receive obscene materials in the home); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (right to public access to broadcasting); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (right to information regarding contraceptives);
Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (right to receive foreign mail with-
out post office censorship); Minarcini v. Strongsville City School District, 541 F.2d 577
(6th Cir. 1976) (right to be exposed to a wide variety of literature). It is important to
note that the "right to receive" is not absolute. See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965)
(no right to receive information by traveling to certain countries to which travel has
been restricted by the Secretary of State).
" 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
91 Id. at 756-57 (emphasis supplied).
92 Id. at 765, 770.
93 While the Court did not explicitly rely on a "right to receive" to support its
formulation of the issue, the Court did recognize this right. For example, in rebutting
the state's contention that the "materially affecting" test was the rationale behind the
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the status and rights of the speaker, ignores the interests of listeners. Similarly
Justice White's perspective, which gives dominant consideration to the first
amendment protection of personal self-expression, is excessively restrictive.
The first amendment's guarantee is broad enough, as Virginia Board shows, to
encompass not only the individual interest in self-expression but also the
broader societal right of access to useful information. In some circumstances
the personalized interest identified by Justice White will control; 94 in other
contexts, maintaining the free flow of information will be the primary con-
cern.95 Often, perhaps, these interests will overlap. The Bellotti Court did not
err in refusing to frame the issue from the perspective of a restricted first
amendment. Rather, the Court took a view which more fully protects all first
amendment rights.
Yet the soundness of the majority's approach does not lie only in its re-
sponsiveness to the broad values underlying the first amendment. An addi-
tional strength is that the Court's analytical framework allows room for con-
sidering those factors which motivate legislatures to treat corporate speech
differently. While the Court in Bellotti refused to consider the speaker's iden-
tity in its threshold identification of protected speech, it did examine interests
advanced by the state regarding particular threats posed by corporate speak-
ers. Each of the state's justifications for imposing the restrictions embodied in
chapter 55, section 8 were tailored to the unique problems created by corpo-
rate communication in the electoral process. Initially, at least the Supreme
Court recognized the validity of these interests." The Court did not hold
that corporate speech cannot be restricted under any circumstances to a
greater extent than individual speech. Instead, Bellotti leaves open the possibil-
ity that restrictions on corporate speech will be upheld if the state can show a
compelling interest which is substantially served by such a restriction."
However, the Court's invalidation of the Massachusetts statute in Bellotti
poses certain problems for states seeking to justify restrictions on corporate
political speech. These problems stem from the Court's probing and critical
evaluation of the interests advanced in Bellotti. As a result, a desire to prevent
undue corporate influence on elections may now be insufficient to support
restrictions on corporate speech.
The "undue influence" issue was the cornerstone of the state's defense of
section 8. The Court disposed of this interest on two separate grounds. First,
the Court assumed the legitimacy of the interest but found inadequate proof
of "undue influence" on the record." While this disposition in theory per-
mits states to prove a danger of undue corporate influence on elections suffi-
cient to justify statutory restrictions on corporate political speech, it does not
prior press and commercial speech cases, (see note 40 supra and accompanying text),
the Court pointed out that these cases were grounded on the public's right to receive a
clean and free flow of information. 435 U.S. at 781-83.
14 See, e.g., Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977); West
Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 3 l9 U.S. 624 (1943).
"' See note 110 supra.
96
 435 U.S. at 788-89, 795.
97
 The Court specifically alluded to this possibility. 435 U.S. at 777 n.13.
" Id. at 789-90.
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suggest how the state is to proceed. Nor does the Court explain, in any detail,
exactly what must be proved since the amount of disproportionate impact on
the electoral process necessary to justify statutory restrictions on corporate
speech was never explained. In addition to these questions of proof, there is a
more fundamental concern involved in a judicial determination of the extent
of influence on elections. Justice White suggested that a judicial inquiry into
the existence of "undue" corporate influence is a step into an area where "the
expertise of legislators is at its peak and that of judges at its lowest." 99 He
thus questioned the competence and propriety of the judicial branch in deal-
ing with questions intimately connected with the electoral process.
Neither of these problems are insurmountable. The Bellotti Court, in
examining the record for evidence of disporportionate corporate influence,
did not usurp the duties and responsibility of the political branches. Rather,
the Court merely exercised its traditional function of weighing and assessing
the evidence before it in light of the applicable standard of review. In this
manner the Court was merely assuring that the legislature exercise its powers
within constitutional limitations. Therefore the competency of judicial bodies
to apply the Bellotti framework is unassailable. In addition, the close scrutiny
given by the Court in Bellotti to claims of undue influence indicates only that
states should be prepared to support, with findings or record evidence, the
need for regulation in the area of corporate first amendment freedoms.'"
However, the Bellotti Court advanced a second reason for rejecting the
state's attempt to protect elections from undue corporate influence; the Court
suggests that such a legislative purpose is, in itself, impermissible."' A state
may not, consistent with the commands of the first amendment, restrict pro-
tected speech merely due to an impact, even disproportionate impact, on
those to whom it is addressed. "The fact that advocacy may persuade the
electorate is hardly a reason to suppress it; the Constitution 'protects expres-
sion which is eloquent no less than that which is unconvincing.' " 302 Simi-
larly, quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 103 the Court stated that expressions by one ele-
ment of society may not be abridged merely to enhance the relative voice of
others.'"
In Justice White's view, this disposition of the undue influence issue is
seriously flawed. In his dissent Justice White argued that due to the special
99 Id.
01) Id. at 789.
101
 It is interesting to note that the "undue influence" interest has been recog-
nized as an interest supporting the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, see note 31 supra
and accompanying text), without any serious question being raised as to the validity of
this governmental concern. See United States v. United Auto Workers, 352 U.S. 567,
570 (1957); United States v. Boyle, 482 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir. 1973); United States v.
Painters Local Union No. 481, 79 F. Supp. 516 (D. Conn. 1948), rev'd on other grounds,
172 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1949); Advisory Opinion on Constitutionality of 1975 Public Act
227, 396 Mich. 465, 242 N.W.2d 3, 13 (1976).
102 435 U.S. at 790, quoting, Kingsley Ina Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S.
684, 689 (1959).
103 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
104 435 U.S. at 790-91, quoting Buckley v. Vaieo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976).
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economic advantage extended to corporations by statute, a state's interest. in
limiting corporate influence was a different and far more important interest
than the mere desire to equalize the resources of candidates. This interest. in
his view was proper and supplied a strong basis for asserting the validity of
section 8.' 5
Inexplicably, Justice Powell failed to deal with this distinction. Instead he
elected simply and without discussion to apply the Buckley rationale to a situa-
tion that arguably called for a different set of balances. While the Court's
failure to squarely confront the purported distinction between the Buckley and
Bellotti situations may be noteworthy, it is submitted that, on balance, the
Court was justified in applying the principle of Buckley to the corporate
speech context. Basic policies and tenets of the first amendment would be
harmed by giving Bucklev the limited application argued by Justice White. The
"profound national committment to the principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust and wide open" 1 °0 does not distinguish those
speakers who have "special advantages" from those that do not. Furthermore,
the Court has refused in the past to allow states to restrict speech simply
because of the speaker's power to influence.'" So long as a speaker can
provide information relative to the discussion or resolution of an issue of pub-
lic concern, the first amendment protects this speech and leaves to the people,
not the government, the power to evaluate the relative strength of the argu-
ments presented.'" As the Bellotti Court noted: "The inherent worth of the
speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon
the identity of its source whether corporation, union or individual." 1 "
In addition, to accept Justice White's view that a corporation's speech may
be constitutionally restricted because of the "special advantages" which corpo-
rate entities enjoy is to elevate in many respects form over substance. While
corporations may amass wealth due to economic advantages extended by the
state, many individuals also profit directly as shareholders from the advan-
tages enjoyed by these corporations. Buckley precludes any attempt to limit the
influence of these individuals although such influence may flow from the very
same advantages as enjoyed by the corporate entity. To deny a corporation
the right to speak because it profits from special advantages is to distinguish
such speech without rational basis. The Bellotti Court correctly refused to
allow the artificial distinction of special advantages to control.
in any event, it is clear that the Court in Bellotti was not willing to permit
restriction of corporate speech merely to prevent alleged undue influence
over the electorate. Undue influence, even if adequately shown, by itself is
insufficient. Actual corruption or some other direct threat of undermining the
democratic processes must be shown before restrictions on communication
protected by the first amendment will be sustained.' 1 °
'" 435 U.S. at 809-10.
"6
 New York Times v, Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
'"' See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
1 " 435 U.S. at 791 & nn.30 & 31, 792.
109 Id. at 777.
10 Id. at 787-91.
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B. Application gf the Bellotti Framework
Although the Bellotti Court sought to emphasize the limitations of its
holdings,"' the decision's impact on the entire problem of corporate speech
cannot be denied. For, while the decision focused only upon corporate spend-
ing in the context of public referenda questions, Bellotti establishes an analyti-
cal framework by which governmental attempts to restrict other types of
corporate communication can be tested in the future. The two-step process
requires first, consideration of the type of speech restricted and second,
evaluation of the restriction under a strict scrutiny standard of review.
It is somewhat ironic, given the large amount of legislation directed to-
ward the communications of business corporations, that a municipal corpora-
tion would rise as one of the original claimants of the first amendment rights
vindicated by Bellotti. Yet when the City of Boston was sued by taxpayers seek-
ing to enjoin the city's use of public funds to support a referendum question
on the 1978 Massachusetts ballot, 12 the city argued, citing Bellotti, that the
first amendment protected its right to communicate its view on the issue to
the public.
The case in which this issue arose was Anderson v. Boston." s Like the
Bellotti case decide two years earlier, the Anderson case came before the Mas-
" Id. at 776-78.
12 The question at issue would, if approved, allow for the classification of
property for real estate tax purposes into residential, business, industrial and vacant
classes. As a result, business and industrial property would he taxed at a higher rate
than residential property. The referendum was an attempt to prevent the predicted
escalation of residential property taxes in light of the Supreme Judicial Court's 1975
ruling that all property, regardless of use, be taxed at its fair cash value. See Weinstock
v. Hull, 367 Mass. 66, 323 N.E.2d 867, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 805 (1975).
"a 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2297, 380 N.E.2d 628 (1978), appeal dismissed, 439 U.S.
1060 (1979). The Anderson case was not the first time that the spending of municipal
funds on behalf of referenda questions has been challenged. Yet, previous challenges
have generally been decided solely on the issue of the extent of the municipality's
spending power under state law, with no first amendment issues raised. See Mines v.
DelValle, 201 Cal. 273, 257 P. 530 (1927); Elsenau v. Chicago, 334 Ill. 78, 165 N.E.
129 (1929); Porter v. Tiffany, 11 Ore. App. 542, 502 P.2d 1385 (1972); Shannon v.
Huron, 9 S.D. 356, 69 N.W. 598 (1896); Port of Seattle v. King County Superior
Court, 93 Wash. 267, 160 P. 755 (1916). The only previous decision in this area rele-
vant to first amendment concerns is City Affairs Comm'n of Jersey City v. Comm'rs of
Jersey City, 134 N.J.L. 180, 46 A.2d 425 (1946), where the Court, in holding that a
municipality could publicize at public expense its position on a referendum question,
discussed the city's right to self-protection and self-advancement. The Court's dis-
course on informing the electorate, though not couched in first amendment language,
touches upon first amendment concerns. In any event, the Jersey City case was severely
cut back just seven years later when the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a munic-
ipality could only spend money concerning a referendum question if it gave a fair
representation to both sides of the issue. Citizens to Protect Public Funds v. Board of
Education of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 13 N.J. 172, 98 A.2d 673 (1953).
The first amendment issues surrounding public spending have been most fre-
quently raised from the perspective of those who object, on first amendment grounds,
to public expenditures for political purposes. See Stanson v. Mott, 17 Cal. 3d 206, 551
P.2d I, 130 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1976); Stern v. Kramansky, 84 Misc. 2d 447, 375 N.Y.S.2d
235 (Sup. Ct. 1975). See also note 99 infra.
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sachusetts Supreme Judicial Court for resolution. The Massachusetts Court,
after determining that state law did not authorize municipal expenditures for
purposes of influencing the vote on a referendum question, 114 addressed the
city's first amendment claim. The Court appeared a bit uncomfortable apply-
ing first amendment principles in a municipal context. 15 However, the
Court chose to examine the problem within the framework provided by the
Supreme Court in Bellotti."' The Court thus assumed that protected expres-
sion was implicated, and applied that strict scrutiny standard of review.'"
The Supreme Judicial Court ultimately concluded, however, that a state's in-
terest in assuring the fairness of elections is compelling and justifies prohibit-
ing municipal speech in the context of ballot referenda questions. 18
On first impression, a distinction is readily apparent between Bellotti and
Anderson. While business corporations, even prior to Bellotti, consistently have
been considered "persons" within the meaning of the fourteenth amend-
ment,'" municipalities have not been so recognized,"° Thus, as a threshold
issue, it could be argued that a municipality has no claim to rights under the
first or fourteenth amendments. However, as, the Anderson Court pointed out,
the Supreme Court in Bellotti expressly rejected an approach which phrases
the issue in terms of the constitutional status of the speaker. The type of
speech restricted and not the identity of the speaker controls. There is no
reason why the Bellotti framework should not be applied in the Anderson con-
text. 121
Attempts to distinguish municipal speech as presented in Anderson from
the corporate speech at issue in Bellotti likely will not prove fruitful. As far as
the type of speech is concerned, the two cases'are surprisingly similar. In both
cases speech relating to referendum issues was involved. The Bellotti Court
found• this type of speech, involving as it does public discussion of gov-
ernmental affairs, to be at the "heart" of the first amendment. Thus the An-
114 The Court held that such spending was inconsistent with, and preempted
by, Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 55, which governs political fund raising and
expenditures in the Commonwealth, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2310, 380 N.E.2d at 633-
34.
1 " Id. at 2312-13, 380 N.E.2d at 637.
"6 Id. at 2311-12, 380 N.E.2d at 636-37, quoting, 435 U.S. at 776.
117
 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2314, 380 N.E.2d at 637-38.
"8 Id. at 2315-20, 380 N.E.2d at 638-40.
1 ' 9 See note 20 supra.120 See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 441 (1939); Risty v. Chicago, R.I. &
Pac. Ry. Co., 270 U.S. 378, 390 (1926); Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182 (1926);
City of Mountlake Terrace v. Wilson, 15 Wash. App. 392, 549 P.2d 497 (1976). But see
Township of River Vale v. Town of Orangetown, 403 F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1968) (town
held to be a "person" within the fourteenth amendment, but only for purposes of
asserting claim against state of which town is not a subdivision).
121 But see Boston v. Anderson, 47 U.S.L.W. 3316 (1979). (Justice Stevens, with
whom Justices Stewart and Rehnquist join, dissenting from denial of motion to vacate
stay order entered by Mr. Justice Brennan on grounds that no federal question is
involved due to constitutional status of municipal corporations).
July 1979]	 CASENOTES	 1023
derson Court was correct in applying the Bellotti framework, and in examining
the prohibition on municipal spending under a standard of strict scrutiny. In
addition, the Supreme Judicial Court's ultimate conclusion was also correct
since the state interests advanced in Anderson, unlike those proposed in Bellotti,
are sufficiently compelling to withstand strict scrutiny. The principal in-
terest 122 advanced by the state in Anderson was the assurance of electoral fair-
ness by maintaining the neutrality of governmental bodies. 123 While this is
somewhat analogous to the interest asserted, and rejected, in Bellotti of pre-
venting undue influence on elections, the additional factor of government
speech presents the problem in a somewhat different light. It is submitted
that this factor is significant, and that the reasoning of the Court in Bellotti
suggests if not compels the conclusion reached by the Supreme Judicial Court
in Anderson.
The rejection of the Government's concern with "undue influence" in
both Bellotti and Buckley v. Valeo illustrates the reluctance of the Supreme
Court to approve government attempts to tinker with the unfettered opera-
tion of the political process or to balance the relative political influence of
different elements in society. However, when closely examined, the speech of
a municipality or other government entity does not represent the vindication
of a right to unfettered access to the political marketplace. Rather, it appears
122 A secondary state interest in Anderson is the protection of taxpayers who
might object to the political use of their tax funds. 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2318-20,
359 N.E.2d at 639-40. See also Stanson v. Mott, 17 Cal.3d 206, 551 P.2d 1, 130 Cal.
Rptr. 697 (1976): Stern v. Kramansky, 84 Misc. 2d 447, 375 N.Y.S.2d 235 (Sup. Ct.
1975). This is somewhat similar to the interest asserted in Bellotti of protecting corpo-
rate shareholders. 435 U.S. at 792-93. Yet there are distinctions between the two. Pub-
lic taxpayers are in a somewhat different position than private shareholders. Thus,
while the Bellotti majority thought Abood v. Detroit Board of Education was inapposite
in that context, 435 U.S. at 794 n.34, the Abood analogy might be relevant in the
Anderson situation. The Bellotti Court rejected the Abood analogy because it found
neither state action nor a limitation on stockholders' freedom when the action of pri-
vate corporations is involved. In the municipal speech situation, state action is obvi-
ously present, and the taxpayer—unlike the shareholder in Bellotti --is by no means
free to withdraw his investment, i.e. his tax funds. Ahood, then, may support the right
of the individual taxpayer to prohibit the use of tax revenue to support a political
viewpoint.
However the Abood analogy alone would not invalidate the municipal claim to free
speech. The Abood Court, sensitive to the rights of the union to communicate its politi-
cal position, limited the remedy of the dissenter so as not to completely silence the
speech of the majority. The Abood Court suggested that the dissenter be refunded the
portion of his funds used improperly. This remedy protects both the union's right to
speak and the dissenting member's right not to be compelled to speak. 431 U.S. at
237-42.
123 A different issue altogether is presented by municipal spending in partisan
election campaigns for candidates. As the Bellotti Court distinguished candidate from
referenda campaigns on the belief that the danger of corruption is present in the
former but lacking in the latter (see 435 U.S. at 790 & n.29), so too municipal spending
on behalf of candidates raises different issues than does spending on nonpartisan ref-
erenda. Whatever may be said concerning referenda as to candidates, it should be
clear that "it is not the function of the government to get itself re-elected." T.1. EMER-
SON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 699 (1970).
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to be the very type of government paternalism criticized and rejected in Bel-
loth and Buckley. As the Supreme Judicial Court stated in Anderson: "[T]he
state government and its various subdivisions should not use public funds to
instruct the people, the ultimate authority, how they should vote." 124
Both Bellotti and Buckley involved statutes seeking to limit and regulate the
political activities of private individuals and corporations. While the expres-
sion of governmental opinion does not directly regulate or restrict the speech
of private parties, it could have the same effect by neutralizing the political
speech of private citizens and associations. Indeed, there is the additional
danger that public debate will be overwhelmed by the speech of governmental
bodies. The type of governmental activity present in Anderson may be even
more damaging to first amendment values than the restrictions imposed in
both Buckley and Bellotti. While those restrictions were content-neutral in that
they worked equally on all candidates or political positions, governmental
speech is not so neutral. The very notion of governmental speech suggests
advocacy of one political view or position over all others.' 25
 Thus, the
reasoning of the Supreme Judicial Court in Anderson is consistent with the
principles of the first amendment as set forth in Bellotti.
CONCLUSION
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti is a landmark first amendment deci-
sion. It represents the first meaningful Supreme Court consideration of the
corporate free speech issue. Yet the Court chose to keep the scope of its hold-
ing narrow by not discussing corporate first amendment rights generally, but
rather by providing a framework for balancing competing interests. This
framework—focusing first on whether the particular speech involved is pro-
tected under the first amendment and, if so, weighing the state interests
against a strict scrutiny standard of review—is the method by which sub-
sequent governmental restrictions on corporate speech will be measured.
When this framework is applied to a claim that. a municipal corporation has a
first amendment right to spend funds on behalf of a referenda question, the
state interest in seeing that governmental units do not interfere with the free-
dom and impartiality of the political marketplace justifies the restriction on
municipal speech.
LAURENCE J. DONOGHUE
324 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2317, 380 N.E.2d at 639.
125
 No similar objection can be found to fair and impartial governmental efforts
to provide the public with both sides of a political debate. This type of governmental
communication does not appear to pose any of the dangers associated with gov-
ernmental advocacy of one side of an issue. See Stanson v. Mott, 17 Cal.3d 206, 551
P.2d 1, 130 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1976); Citizens to Prdteet Public Funds v. Board of Educa-
tion of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 13 N.J. 172, 98 A.2d 673 (1953). Instead, it is a direct
contribution to the pool of information necessary for the individual to make informed
and intelligent political choices. The Buckley Court., in upholding the public financing
provisions of the Federal Elections Campaign Act, looked upon the statute as an effort
"not to abridge restrict or censor speech, but rather to use public money to facilitate
and enlarge public discussion and participation in the electoral process, goals vital to a
self-governing people." 424 U.S. at 92-93.
